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Abstract: Few governments have introduced electronic voting so far. They are all facing criticism 
regarding the trustworthiness of their systems. The project “Selectio Helvetica” aims at developing 
an Internet voting system that can withstand such doubts more easily. It offers full transparency by 
publishing all the relevant voting data on a public bulletin board. This enables voters to verify the 
inclusion of their votes and the correctness of the tallying. The underlying cryptographic protocol 
differs from other protocols since it involves mixing the voters’ public signature keys, rather than 
mixing the votes themselves. This paper introduces the Selectio Helvetica project and the 
cryptographic protocol in a way that is meant to attract an audience that does not necessarily have 
much technical background; namely representatives from legislation, jurisdiction, governmental 
chancelleries and, not least, the electorate itself. 
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ver the past decade, the Internet has enabled providers across all sectors to profoundly 
improve their services. In particular, online banking services have enjoyed their breakthrough. 
Just as e-voting technology must do today, e-banking had to withstand doubts. It seems 
unlikely that doubters have gained their trust by reading the software manuals of their banks. It was 
rather positive experience over time that made e-banking appear to them to be sufficiently safe. By 
observing their balance sheets, even doubters were able to verify that their transactions are 
booked correctly. In the vast majority of cases, things just did not go wrong. 
1. Introduction 
If e-banking works, why should people distrust e-voting systems? After all, it seems far more 
tempting for criminals to steal money instead of votes. But is it really? The temptation to commit a 
crime is generated not only by the pay-off in the case of success. It is also qualified by the 
probability of the crime actually succeeding. Since banks traditionally provide recurring transaction 
summaries, customers can always object if they feel their money has been stolen, thus exposing 
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the crime. Voting providers (governments) are not blessed with any similar mechanism. As a 
matter of fact, they never needed to convince individual voters that their votes have been 
considered in the final tally; the voters convinced themselves by observing their ballot slip going 
into the ballot box while knowing that the box remains under surveillance throughout the rest of the 
voting procedure. In contrast, a given e-voting system, which requires the electorate to blindly trust 
in the correct transmission of their ballots, might arouse the temptation of letting some votes 
disappear. A sophisticated e-voting system will therefore come along with a mechanism that 
convinces voters that their electronic votes have correctly reached their destination. 
Putting an appropriate mechanism in place is unfortunately far from trivial; if it is good at 
convincing voters that their votes will be counted, it will be good at convincing violent coercers or 
vote-buyers as well. Furthermore, unlike customers in e-banking, voters do not only consider the 
destiny of their own ballots. While bank customers pay no attention to their neighbors’ transactions, 
voters will want to be convinced that the final tally properly reflects the electorate's will, or 
technically speaking, that the ballot box contains ballots cast by eligible voters only, and one at 
most. An e-voting system that requires the electorate to blindly trust in the content of the ballot box 
being correct, might invite criminals to add extra votes for their favorite candidate. 
The few governments that have introduced e-voting so far are facing criticism regarding the 
trustworthiness of their systems (Schryen & Rich, 2009). Selectio Helvetica (SH) is a project aiming 
at developing an Internet voting system that can withstand such doubts more easily. In particular, it 
is designed to solve the hard problems that have been described so far, while maintaining the 
secrecy of the ballot. 
This paper describes the SH system and outlines its security features along with potential 
pitfalls. Apart from the e-voting research community, it is meant to attract an audience that does 
not necessarily have much technical background; namely representatives from legislation, 
jurisdiction, governmental chancelleries, and not least, the electorate itself. We thus hope to 
integrate potential stakeholders into the assessment of contemporary e-voting techniques in 
general, and the presented scheme in particular. The objective of such an assessment is an 
operative e-voting system that fulfills legal requirements, complies with voting traditions, and has 
well-analyzed security properties, which all stakeholders can understand and declare as sufficient. 
SH is currently being developed at the Bern University of Applied Sciences (BFH) in Switzerland. 
A preliminary version of the SH system has been employed by Baloti.ch. This is an Internet voting 
platform for Swiss migrants provided by the Centre for Democracy Studies (ZDA) in Aarau. 
2. Electronic Voting and Cryptographic Primitives 
For an e-voting system to be secure, it has to function without vulnerabilities in potentially insecure 
environments such as the Internet. By insecure environment we mean that the existence of 
malicious individuals (or co-operating groups of malicious individuals) is assumed throughout the 
whole system. For example, it is assumed that network traffic is intercepted, system administrators 
are corrupt, voters try to cheat, computers are infected by malware, etc. For an e-voting system to 
work properly even under such unideal circumstances, it has to be implemented according to an 
intrinsically secure design. As a guideline for designing and implementing such a system, the 
literature on e-voting technologies offers a whole catalogue of general security requirements, which 
the system should satisfy under all possible scenarios (Cranor & Cytron, 1996, and Nielsen & 
Andersen & Nielson, 2005). The key instrument for establishing these requirements is 
cryptography. Below we will informally introduce the most important of these requirements and 
corresponding cryptographic primitives. Some of these primitives will also be used in the SH 
system. 
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Privacy 
An e-voting system is private if no vote cast can be linked to its voter, neither by voting authorities 
nor anyone else (anonymity), and if no voter can prove that he or she voted in a particular way 
(receipt-freeness). 
As a first measure, privacy is established by encrypting the vote before casting it. The voter's 
particular candidate choice is thus converted into a ciphertext to prevent unauthorized third parties 
from reading it. The encryption key is the so-called public key of the voting authority and is publicly 
known, while the corresponding private key may later be used to decrypt the vote. Note that 
different encryptions of the same candidate choice should not result in exactly the same ciphertext, 
since this would obviously spoil the anonymity of the vote. It is thus crucial to employ a randomised 
encryption scheme, which individualizes each encryption with a random value. 
To perform the final tallying, votes are decrypted individually before performing the actual 
tallying. To avoid the possibility that a link to the voter can be established easily after performing 
the decryption, we may employ a re-encryption mix-net to shuffle the encrypted votes. In addition 
to altering the positions of the votes in the list, shuffling also includes re-encrypting them. As a 
result, no link between the input and output of the mix-net can be established, which finally 
guarantees the anonymity of the vote. In addition to shuffling and re-encrypting, the mix-net must 
also provide a cryptographic proof of doing so correctly. 
Receipt-freeness is one the most difficult requirements, for which no general cryptographic 
solution exists. In the context of a hybrid voting system (Spycher & Haenni & Dubuis, 2010), 
however, the problem is solved by exploiting traditional paper-based voting channels. 
Fairness 
A system is fair if no intermediate results can be obtained before the voting period ends. 
Using an encryption scheme as explained above does not prevent the voting authority, which is 
in possession of the private decryption key, to perform a decryption before the end of the voting 
period. This problem can be avoided by splitting up the private key into several key shares and by 
distributing them among several independent tallying authorities. So-called threshold secret 
sharing schemes allow a shared secret (the private key in this case) to be re-constructed by any 
group of  (for threshold) or more share owners, but such that no group of fewer than  share 
owners can. In a threshold cryptosystem, it is even possible for a group of  or more share owners 
to decrypt a given ciphertext without actually re-constructing the private key. Under the assumption 
that fewer than  tallying authorities are malicious, this obviously asserts the voting system to be 
fair. 
Democracy 
An e-voting system is democratic if only eligible voters can vote (eligibility) and if eligible voters can 
only vote once (uniqueness). 
To exclude unauthorised individuals from voting, most systems assume some sort of voter 
credentials, which are distributed to the electorate during registration. The credential is usually a 
secret random value with an associated public part; for example, a private and public signature 
key. To prove eligibility, voters must use the credential to digitally sign the encrypted vote. By 
verifying digital signatures, one can check if votes cast originate from registered voters and 
whether they are unique. 
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Accuracy 
An e-voting system is accurate if votes cast cannot be altered (integrity), valid votes cannot be 
eliminated from the final tally (completeness), and invalid votes are not counted in the final tally 
(soundness). 
During transmission to the voting server, the integrity can easily be ensured by letting voters 
digitally sign their votes cast. However, these signatures must be removed (or disguised) at some 
point to allow the anonymization of the votes. From then on, the vote will no longer be under the 
voter's control. Nevertheless to establish trust in the accuracy of the tally, voting systems are 
required to be verifiable. 
Verifiability 
An e-voting system is individually verifiable if voters can independently verify that their own votes 
have been counted correctly in the final tally. A system is universally verifiable, if voters can 
independently verify that all votes cast are from legitimate voters and that they have been counted 
correctly in the final tally. Individual and universal verifiability together is sometimes called end-to-
end verifiability. 
Verifiability is usually achieved by publishing all votes cast (together with corresponding 
cryptographic proofs) on a public bulletin board. Voters can read the content of the board and post 
new entries (possibly to their own board sections), but nobody can delete or change anything. In 
this way, voters are able to individually verify the inclusion of their votes and to re-compute the 
result of the tallying. The general idea is to make the voting system completely transparent by 
publishing all the relevant voting data. The security of the system is thus fully protected by 
cryptographic means instead of technical or procedural measures. 
3. Selectio Helvetica 
The Selectio Helvetica (SH) project aims at developing an Internet voting solution that complies 
with the crucial security properties. Furthermore, it is designed to potentially serve as the electronic 
channel of a hybrid voting system with regard to the Swiss political context (Spycher & Haenni & 
Dubuis, 2010). Although it is not planned to be immediately employed for political elections and 
referendums, SH will provide Internet voting services to non-governmental voting organizers, thus 
offering a proof of concept. The Baloti project (see Section 4) has already run three referendums 
using the preliminary version of the SH system. The voter-verifiable implementation discussed here 
is scheduled for operation in fall 2011. 
Section 3.1 introduces the cryptographic protocol that underlies SH. It explains the basic security 
properties under the restriction that voters can receive their personal voting credentials through a 
privacy-preserving channel that guarantees the voters' authenticity (authenticated channel). This 
restriction seems reasonable, given that governments will offer an infrastructure for distributing 
them. In contrast, the budgets of non-governmental voting organizers can be tight. Therefore, SH 
involves e-mail for distributing credentials. Section 3.2 explains how the SH system works under an 
extension of the underlying protocol. 
3.1. The Selectio Helvetica Protocol 
The underlying protocol is a modification of the one introduced in (Spycher & Haenni, 2010). Due 
to space constraints, the present paper leaves the secure vote revocation protocol of the hybrid 
system undiscussed. 
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First Approach 
Digital signatures offer a common way of ensuring the authenticity and integrity of messages. If 
Mrs. Smith signs a message using her private signature key , the receiver Mr. Ryan can 
convince himself that the sender of the message is not an imposter, who just claims to be Mrs. 
Smith. To do so, he uses Mrs. Smith's public signature key  and compares it with the message's 
signature and the message itself. Given that Mr. Ryan believes that Mrs. Smith keeps her private 
signature key  to herself, he is assured about the origin of the message, if the result yields a 
match. 
Mrs. Smith
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vote
encrypt
sign
cast
Smith
...
...
...
Public Key
...
...
...
Voter Roll
verify
Smith
...
...
...
Vote
...
...
...
Public Board
publish
 
Figure 1: Simplified Internet Voting 
The technique of digital signing can be employed in Internet voting as well. Imagine Mrs. Smith is a 
voter and Mr. Ryan is the government. The government holds the voter roll enlisting all eligible 
voters, including Mrs. Smith. For the purpose of Internet voting, the voter roll is published on the 
Internet, showing each of its entries coupled with the voter's public signature key , which the 
government uses to verify the authenticity of messages. When Mrs. Smith wants to cast her vote, 
she enters her candidate choice in the computer, which encrypts her vote using the government's 
public key. The result is the message she is about to send to the government. Since only the 
government can decrypt her message, she does not need to fear that any curious people on the 
Internet can find out how she voted. To convince the government that her vote should be counted, 
Mrs. Smith enters her private signature key  into her computer to generate the signature of her 
message and sends both to the government. After receiving her message, the government verifies 
that the sender of the message is Mrs. Smith by comparing the signature with the message using 
her public key . Since she is enlisted in the voter roll, the government will know that it needs to 
decrypt her vote and count it. However, before decryption, the government should wait until the 
voting phase is over (fairness). Furthermore, it needs to apply a re-encryption mix-net on the set of 
all collected votes, in order not to learn how Mrs. Smith voted (privacy). 
Discussion 
The simplified scheme presented holds a number of obvious and maybe not so obvious pitfalls. 
These are discussed in the following Q&A section. 
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Q: How can voters be certain that the government does not secretly decrypt their votes before 
applying the re-encryption mix-net? 
A: The full protocol requires a majority  of authorities to participate at the decryption (threshold 
cryptosystem). This implies that one authority alone cannot decrypt any votes. In fact, even no 
coalition of less than  conspiring authorities has a chance at decrypting Mrs. Smith's message. If 
it seems reasonable to assume that a majority of the authorities will refrain from being dishonest, 
the described measures ensure the voters' privacy and prevent premature decryption of votes. 
Q: How can voters verify that all and only legitimate votes are counted? 
A: The authorities' environment publishes the electronic ballot box, which comprises the set of all 
collected votes (public bulletin board). If Mrs. Smith ever believes that her vote might not have 
reached the electronic ballot box or that it has been deleted from there, she can always verify that 
her vote is correctly enlisted by downloading a copy of the electronic ballot box (individual 
verifiability). By additionally downloading a copy of the electronic voter roll and verifying all 
signatures of the encrypted votes and the zero-knowledge proofs provided by the mix-net, she 
verifies that all and only legitimate votes are counted (universal verifiability). 
Q: If voters reveal their identity by signing their encrypted votes, they declare to the public that 
they have participated at the vote. Furthermore, voters that do not participate are publicly exposed. 
A: In the full protocol, the public keys used for verifying signatures are mixed prior to the voting 
phase (using a public key mix-net, which is similar to a standard re-encryption mix-net). Thus, Mrs. 
Smith can still sign her message by using the same private signature key , while the verification 
of the signature is done by using her anonymous public key , called her pseudonym. Since the 
correctness of the public key mix-net is verifiable by downloading the corresponding zero-
knowledge proofs, universal verifiability remains in place. 
Q: If voters can verify that their votes are counted correctly, they can prove to vote-buyers and 
coercers how they voted. Moreover, voters can even hand out their private signature key , 
although they are supposed to keep it to themselves. 
A: This is true if the SH protocol is used as a stand-alone voting channel. However, vote-buying 
and coercion are mitigated by requiring voters to revoke and overrule their electronic vote at the 
polling station (hybrid system). In the case that no polling stations are available, the SH scheme is 
clearly not coercion-resistant. We believe that this is unproblematic as long as SH is used as a 
proof of concept for non-governmental voting events. 
Q: If the voters' computers run viruses, they might display corrupt information at verification and 
mislead voters. 
A: This is true. The so-called trusted platform problem needs to be addressed independently of 
the presented protocol. Whether the available counter-measures suffice is a matter of dispute and 
requires thorough analysis. 
Concise Description 
The full protocol assumes two groups of players (voters and authorities), the existence of a voter 
roll, an initially empty public bulletin board, an anonymous channel for casting the votes, and a 
secure authenticated channel between authorities and voters. 
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Figure 2: The SH protocol 
The protocol is divided into four phases: 
1. Setup: The authorities jointly generate a signature key pair  for each potential voter, mix the 
public keys  into pseudonyms , and generate a shared encryption key. All these 
parameters are published on the public board. 
2. Voter Registration: A voter is associated to an unused public signature key . The authorities 
send their shares of the corresponding private signature key  to the voter. The voter re-
constructs the private key from the shares.  
3. Vote Casting: The voter requests the relevant parameters and keys from the public board, 
encrypts the vote using the public encryption key of the authorities, signs the vote using the 
private signature key  and sends it together with the computed pseudonym  back to the 
public board. 
4. Tallying: The authorities use their shared private keys to decrypt the votes, for which the 
signatures hold against valid pseudonyms. The results are published on the public board. 
Since the public board contains all proofs required by the primitives described in Section 2, the 
public can verify that all and only legitimate votes are counted. By using their private signature 
keys  to compute their pseudonyms, voters can verify that their votes have been decrypted as 
intended. 
3.2. The Selectio Helvetica System 
The outlined protocol is primarily designed to run governmental votes. The SH system is meant to 
constitute a proof of concept of that protocol by running an Internet voting service for non-
governmental vote organisers. Since they tend to operate on lower scale budgets, they do not 
necessarily run an infrastructure that includes a secure authenticated channel to transmit the 
shares of voters' private signature keys in a user-friendly way (step 2 of the protocol). Similarly, 
vote organisers will not usually offer any hardware, such as smart cards for voters to easily store 
and read their private keys. Further, in contrast to the assumption of the protocol, vote organizers 
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do not necessarily own a final voter roll prior to the beginning of the voting phase. The SH system 
is meant to address these restrictions. 
Instead of requiring voters to save their very long, unintuitive private signature keys, in the SH 
system they request their shares from the authorities each time they need it for computations. 
Whenever voters need their private signature keys, they simply enter a password that they have 
chosen themselves at registration. 
Extension of the Protocol 
The extended protocol underlying the SH system involves two additional players. The vote 
organizer assesses the voter's right to vote. The voting provider acts as an intermediary among 
voters and authorities, and writes to the public board. 
The registration phase is extended as follows: A voter first asks the vote organizer to sign his e-
mail address in order to confirm that he is enlisted in the voter roll. The voter then sends the signed 
e-mail address to the voting provider. He by return associates the voter's e-mail address with an 
unused public key  on the public board and sends the registration credentials back to the voter 
by e-mail. (Instead of the e-mail address a nickname chosen by the voter could be published.) The 
voter chooses a password and uses it to compute one designated hash code per authority. These 
hash codes are sent to the authorities along with the registration credentials. The authorities verify 
the credentials and map the hash code to their share of the private signature key  corresponding 
to the voter's public signature key . 
Whenever an authority receives a request with a valid hash value, it replies with the share of the 
private signature key  mapped to it. Thus, if voters want to cast their vote, they only have to enter 
their password. 
The other phases of the SH system follow directly from the original protocol. 
Employed Technologies 
The SH system is implemented using only well-defined, widely used, and standardized 
technologies. Components communicate through web services. Since web services are based on 
XML, the components can be implemented and operated on any platform, such as Java EE or 
.NET. Furthermore, communication channels are secured on the transport layer using HTTPS. 
The usability and performance features of the components used by the voters are crucial. At the 
same time, a technology must be used which is available on virtually all potential computers used 
by voters. This is addressed by letting voters use web browsers running JavaScript and Java 
accessed through LiveConnect. 
The server-side components are implemented using the Java EE platform and operated on a 
JBoss application server. In addition to the core functionality, each component has been enhanced 
by a management console, which allows to initialize and monitor the components during operation. 
4. The Baloti Project 
On the Internet platform Baloti.ch the migrant population living in Switzerland can cast votes with 
the help of Selectio Helvetica. A public call for integration projects by the Swiss Federal 
Commission for Migration Issues allowed an interdisciplinary consortium to design and test a 
multilingual Internet platform mimicking Swiss referendum politics as a two year pilot starting in 
2010. Besides politically neutral information on current referendum votes, the website offers a 
replica of a ballot vote for all issues at stake on the Swiss national level and thus provides a test-
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bed environment for electronic voting. Because of the political nature of the project and the 
sensitive information (political preferences) that is passed on from the web browser to the 
electronic urn, it was important to provide a secure Internet voting system. In order to build up trust 
in the system, we opted against having a user registration and a permanently stored user profile. 
In order to understand the motivation behind the project, three points of background information 
should be taken into account: 
 The Swiss political system allows its citizens to vote not only on the occasion of elections but 
also on concrete issues three to four times a year on all three state levels (national, cantonal, 
local). A ballot can be triggered automatically in case of constitutional matters or by the 
collection of a certain amount of signatures. The vote can block legislation (referendum) or 
suggest new provisions (initiative). These various mechanisms of direct democracy can affect 
the constitution, international and domestic treaties, laws as well as ordinances and thus touch 
the people's life in many respects, whether they have Swiss citizenship or not. 
 At 22 percent, the population of migrants living in Switzerland is comparatively high. To gain full 
citizenship and voting rights migrants can start a naturalization procedure after twelve years of 
residence. In practice, a large part of the population is thus not fully integrated in the political life 
of the country. Whereas most of the French speaking cantons have given migrants voting rights 
on the local and/or cantonal level, respective initiatives have mainly been turned down in the 
Italian and German speaking cantons. However, a few German speaking cantons allow their 
communes to introduce political rights for migrants at their own will (e.g. Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden, Grisons). 
 The three cantons of Geneva, Neuchâtel, and Zurich are testing Internet voting systems for 
several years now (Serdült, 2010). However, only 10 percent of the total population is allowed to 
participate in these Internet voting experiments. That is the reason why in practice  Internet 
voting in the three cantons is restricted to a couple of pilot communes. In addition to the resident 
citizens, Internet voting is on the way to being made available to all Swiss living abroad by 2015. 
Henceforth, there is an increased interest and demand for applied research on the topic of 
secure Internet voting. 
The main motivation of Baloti.ch is therefore to grant migrants living in Switzerland the opportunity 
to familiarize themselves with the Swiss political system in a novel and realistic way. On our 
platform migrants can practice direct democracy in the eleven most spoken languages in 
Switzerland (German, French, Italian, English, Spanish, Portuguese, Turkish, Albanian, Serbian, 
Croatian, and Tamil). With Baloti.ch we therefore contribute to the political integration of migrants. 
Whereas migrants without voting rights constitute the most important target group, the website can 
also be useful for the Swiss living abroad, for young Swiss citizens under 18 and for civic education 
purposes in schools in general. 
The goal of the pilot is threefold: Firstly, migrants living in Switzerland without voting rights are 
granted an opportunity to manifest themselves politically. The results of the vote are displayed 
almost the same hour when the official vote closes and is further communicated via Facebook and 
Twitter. Secondly, visitors of the platform can learn how direct democracy works and practice it one 
to one. Baloti.ch therefore helps to bridge the twelve years until the naturalization process can 
eventually be started. Thirdly, at least ideally, the political will of the migrant population is made 
transparent. In the research part behind the project we would like to find out whether the voting 
behavior of migrants differs significantly from the one of Swiss voters. As a working hypothesis we 
expect the differences between the two groups to be minimal as soon as a reasonably high 
number of migrants starts voting on Baloti.ch. 
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Baloti.ch is activated three weeks before a national referendum vote. This three week period 
corresponds to the time span Swiss citizens are allowed to cast their vote. During the voting period 
the electronic ballot box on Baloti.ch is open and information on all national votes is displayed 
(content of the vote at stake, arguments in favor and against the bill, recommendations by political 
parties, parliament and the government). All initial text material is provided by one of our partners 
(Vimentis) in German, slightly adapted and then carefully translated by an external team. The 
translators are all native speakers, and all translations are subject to the four eye principle. 
With the help of press releases, coverage on Swiss TV and radio stations, Facebook and 
Google Ads, contacting migrant organizations as well as all official competence centers for 
migration issues throughout the country Baloti.ch was advertised and went online for the first time 
during the September 2010 vote on a revision of the Swiss Unemployment Insurance Law. Voters 
had ten days to cast their vote (16th to 26th of September 2010). During that time span the website 
had 3'300 single visitors (according to Google analytics). Roughly 10 percent of all visitors cast a 
vote by first obtaining a voting credentials by e-mail and then deciding whether to be in favor or 
against the bill. 60 percent of the Baloti voters opposed the bill whereas the official result of the 
Swiss citizens showed a 53 percent acceptance. For the second Baloti vote in November 2010 the 
website had 4'500 visitors but fewer votes than in September 2010. Only 240 visitors bothered to 
cast a vote. The decrease of cast votes could partly be attributed to the complicated nature of the 
bills and several pending usability problems. During the remaining time of the pilot until the end of 
2011 we will address these issues and constantly improve the site. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The SH protocol and system have been presented on an introductive level. Although there are 
secure solutions to questions like what happens if users forget their passwords or how do voters 
handle corrupt shares of their private signature key , they are out of the scope of this paper. Not 
letting anyone know how voters have voted, not even letting anyone know whether they have 
participated, being able to detect fraud, even in the case of all authorities being corrupt, summarize 
the strong features of this protocol. Mathematically proving the positive security features of SH is 
left to a more formal paper. Instead, we aim at including a broad audience of stakeholders in the 
assessment of e-voting technology. In that spirit, we outline some critical issues for discussion. 
 Trusted Platform: A computer that runs viruses can cast corrupted votes and mislead at 
verification, or send private information to third parties. Which measures need to be applied to 
optimally and sufficiently address the problem? 
 Integrity: In case verification fails, voters can re-submit their vote until they witness a correct 
encryption of their vote on the public board. Does this comply with the superior legal constraints? 
 Coercion-Resistance: Within the containing hybrid system, coercion is mitigated by allowing 
voters to securely revoke (i.e., the correct vote gets excluded while privacy remains in place) 
and overrule their vote at the polling station. Is this a sufficient measure to address vote-buying 
and coercion? 
 Dispute: To avoid disputes, voting providers could declare it the voters' responsibility to verify 
that their vote has been cast correctly using a trusted platform. In case re-submitting the vote 
does not help, they are required to revoke and overrule their vote at the polling station. Is this 
feasible, considering that voters do not participate at every vote? 
 Privacy: Voters do not necessarily trust the privacy inducing measures of the administration's 
software and processes. By defining multiple authorities, voters merely need to trust in a majority 
of the organizations working correctly, which is clearly an improvement. But is it sufficient? 
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 Privacy: The cryptographic measures that induce privacy on the public board will sooner or later 
be broken. Is it a problem if the public learns how their ancestors voted 100 years ago? 
We see SH as a starting point to debate these open questions in more specific terms. 
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